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What if Romeo “Facebooked” Juliet: A Call
to Reform Internet Solicitation and Juvenile
Sex Offender Laws in the “Digital Age”
Erin Heaney*
ABSTRACT
A modern twist on a classic romance: Romeo and Juliet fall in love
in the twenty-first century. The same youth, naivety, and passion play out
in the digital age. The families fight over bitcoins and Romeo and Juliet
exchange tender words of love by iMessage, Tweet, or E-mail. Everything
is exactly as expected, but tragedy strikes the couple in a way no one saw
coming.
In this contemporary tale of young love, both are spared death, but at
a cost. In this version, Romeo is convicted for internet solicitation of a
minor and must register as a sex offender for the rest of his life. Not the
ending you saw coming? Nevertheless, such is the fate of our young
Romeo, living in 2020, if he pursued Juliet through iMessage, Tweets, or
E-mail rather than at her balcony window. This unexpected ending to a
classic love story is the result of outdated and overbroad internet
solicitation statutes prevalent throughout the United States. To prevent the
unintended consequences of these laws on adolescent offenders, this
Comment recommends that states: (1) revise their statutes to reflect an
exception for adolescent offenders; (2) allow the judiciary the discretion
to make exceptions on a case-by-case basis; or (3) offer adolescents a
meaningful opportunity for review or appeal of their registration
requirements after rehabilitation.

*J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law, 2020.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The sounds of typing overcome the din of a busy household as
ROMEO sits on the living room couch, staring at his laptop screen. He
smiles, sheepishly, looking up as he thinks of what to say next. Returning
his gaze to the screen, he types quickly “WYD?”1 and awaits a reply. Three

1. The phrase “WYD” is a texting abbreviation generally meaning “what (are) you
doing.” See wyd, DICTIONARY.COM, https://bit.ly/2CyYTkh (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
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little dots appear. He waits, anxiously, for the three little dots to give way
to a little grey bubble with a text from his beloved.
ROMEO furrows his brow as the dots disappear, then reappear, then
disappear again, before finally receiving the long-awaited message:
“NMU?”2 At last, JULIET has replied. The conversation continues until,
finally, the pair arrange to meet up next Friday after the football game,
behind the bleachers, 9:00 pm. ROMEO types, “cool.” JULIET replies,
“cul8r.”3 End scene.
But the modern version of the traditional love story as you know it
ends there. After meeting up behind the bleachers to have sex, Romeo is
arrested and charged with violating the Verona internet solicitation statute.
Convicted of this crime, Romeo must register as a sex offender for the rest
of his life. Now that is a tragedy that even Shakespeare would not write.4
To save the fate of our modern Romeo, this Comment argues that
states must revise their respective internet solicitation statutes to reflect
the rapid growth of internet-based communication between adolescents.5
Part II of this Comment will explain how internet solicitation statutes6
became a threat to adolescent communication and romance by examining
the statutes themselves.7 Part II will also address how societal
understanding of the internet has changed during the decades since the
statutes were enacted.8
Part II then examines why these statutes now pose a threat to
adolescent communication: changes to sex offender registries9 and the
explosion of internet-based communication.10 Additionally, Part II will
address how courts apply internet solicitation statutes to adolescent
offenders today11 and the legal distinctions between juvenile and adult
offenders.12 Part III analyzes how the inclusion of juveniles on sex

2. The phrase “NMU” is also a texting abbreviation meaning “Not much, you?” It is
often used as a reply to the question “What are you doing?” See NMU, DICTIONARY.COM,
https://bit.ly/2W6kR75 (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
3. The phrase “cul8r” is a texting abbreviation meaning “see you later.” See CUL8R,
URBANDICTIONARY.COM, https://bit.ly/2W3mbaJ (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
4. For the purpose of this Comment, the author presumes most adolescents implicated
by the intersection of sex offender registration and internet solicitation statutes share the
following characteristics of Romeo: juvenile, close in age to the “victim,” and are engaged
in a consensual sexual relationship. The author recognizes that not all juveniles convicted
of internet solicitation fit these characteristics, however, the appropriate application of
internet solicitation statutes to such individuals is beyond the scope of this Comment.
5. See infra Section II.C.
6. See infra Section II.A.
7. See infra Section II.A.2.
8. See infra Section II.A.3.
9. See infra Section II.B.2.
10. See infra Section II.C.
11. See infra Section II.E.1.
12. See infra Section II.F.
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offender registries,13 despite the constitutional differences between
juveniles and adults,14 compounds the threat internet solicitation statutes
pose to adolescent romantic communication.15 Thus, Part III recommends
three courses of action to remedy the problem of punishing adolescent
sexual communications.16 Part IV offers concluding statements on the
issues raised herein.17
II.

BACKGROUND

Nearly every state has enacted “internet solicitation statutes,” which
prohibit the use of computers or the internet to solicit children18 to engage
in sexual conduct.19 The influx of these statutes began in the 1990s and
early 2000s,20 responding to the growing public fear of child sexual
exploitation by electronic or technological means.21
While state legislatures were enacting new laws to prohibit the
internet solicitation of children,22 the federal government was attempting
to regulate sex offenders.23 Thus, the early 2000s introduced laws that
protected children from sexual predators but also included children on sex
offender registries.24 In 2009, just a few years after juveniles were included
on sex offender registries, the Department of Justice estimated that
juveniles accounted for more than one-third of all registered sex offenders
in the United States.25 Although child sexual exploitation over the internet
13. See infra Section III.B.
14. See infra Section III.C.
15. See infra Section III.A.
16. See infra Section III.D.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. Throughout this Comment, the terms “children” and “adolescents” refer to legal
minors of distinct age groups. In this Comment, the term “children” refers to minors aged
0–12 years and the term “adolescents” refers to minors aged 13–17 years. The terms
“minor,” “legal minor,” or “juvenile” refer to individuals under 18 years of age.
19. See State Laws: Electronic Solicitation or Luring of Children, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 5, 2015), https://bit.ly/2F2nimI.
20. See infra Section II.A.
21. See DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL., THE CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN RESEARCH
CENTER, ONLINE VICTIMIZATION: A REPORT ON THE NATION’S YOUTH at ix (2000) (noting
that “[a]pproximately one in five [children between the ages of 10 to 17] received a sexual
solicitation or approach over the Internet in the last year”).
22. See FLA. STAT. § 847.0135 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 649-B:4 (2009); see
also ALA. CODE § 13A-6-122 (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100.2(d)(1) (2007).
23. See Karen J. Terry & Alissa R. Ackerman, A Brief History of Major Sex Offender
Laws, in SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS 50, 55 (Richard G.
Wright ed., 2d ed. 2015).
24. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
120 Stat. 587 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–91 (2006)).
25. See DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL., JUVENILES WHO COMMIT SEX OFFENSES AGAINST
MINORS 1–2 (2009), available at https://bit.ly/2RAyDQO. But see Alison Parker & Nicole
Pittman, Raised on the Registry, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 1, 2013), https://bit.ly/1HrFkcV
(explaining that “[i]t is unknown how many persons are subject to registration laws in the
United States for crimes committed as children . . . from publicly available national data”);
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is still a real concern today,26 the failure of internet solicitation statutes to
reflect the immense change to our virtual world has opened the door for
unwitting adolescents to become registered sex offenders.
A.

Internet Solicitation Statutes: “Certain Uses of Computer
Prohibited”

Understanding the threat these internet solicitation statutes pose to
adolescents communicating in the digital age27 requires an analysis of the
statutes themselves. An examination of these statutes will focus on three
primary characteristics: their goal,28 their language,29 and what they reflect
about societal understanding of the internet.30
1.

The Goal

The development of internet solicitation statutes throughout the
United States illustrated the growing fears of legislatures and citizens
when it came to children and the internet.31 In New Hampshire, for
example, the principal sponsor of the internet solicitation bill articulated
that the goal was to “provide[] additional protection for our youth by
increasing penalties for internet crimes.”32
The New Hampshire legislature generally “viewed individuals who
use computer online services or internet services to seduce or solicit
children to engage in certain sexual activities as particularly dangerous.”33
Internet crimes were considered dangerous because they allowed an adult
behind the veil of a computer screen to anonymously prowl for children in

HUGH H. HUDSON, WHITE PAPER ON THE ADAM WALSH CHILD PROTECTION AND SAFETY
ACT OF 2006, at 17 (2008); Map of Registered Sex Offenders, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING &
EXPLOITED CHILD. (Nov. 4, 2011), https://bit.ly/2qqYWsH.
26. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Richard Pérez-Peña, Wildly Popular App Kik Offers
Teenagers, and Predators, Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2016),
https://nyti.ms/2rYIhNn.
27. For the purposes of this Comment, the phrase “digital age” is assumed to have the
same meaning as the “information age.” According to Merriam-Webster, the “information
age” refers to “time in which information has become a commodity that is quickly and
widely disseminated and easily available especially through the use of computer
technology.” Information Age, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://bit.ly/2zCbKza (last visited
Apr. 28, 2020).
28. See infra Section II.A.1.
29. See infra Section II.A.2.
30. See infra Section II.A.3.
31. See, e.g., An Act Prohibiting Internet Solicitation and Exploitation of Children:
Hearing on S.B. 495 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2008 Legis. Sess. (N.H. 2008)
(statement of Sen. Joseph Foster) [hereinafter Judiciary Comm. on SB 495]; see also 50
State Survey of Grooming and Child Solicitation Statutes, A.B.A., (on file with author)
[hereinafter ABA 50 State Survey].
32. Judiciary Comm. on SB 495, supra note 31 (statement of Sen. Joseph Foster).
33. State v. Serpa, 187 A.3d 107, 111 (N.H. 2018).
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the safety of their own homes.34 The fears of parents and law
enforcement35 stemmed from the increasing ubiquity of online chat
platforms. Indeed, these platforms became increasingly available to
children and families with “the advent of low cost computers, easily
available communication channels, and large network systems.”36
These online chat platforms also allowed for a level of anonymity,
which was the real danger that parents feared for their children.37 Without
any identifying feature other than one’s username, users could easily claim
they were 16-year-old teens when in fact they were “55-year-old
pedophile[s].”38 With these fears in mind, but with little knowledge of the
developing technology, citizens looked to their respective legislatures for
protection.39
2.

The Language

States vary widely in the breadth of the devices encompassed by their
internet solicitation statutes.40 Some statutes employ only a few terms to
establish the kinds of internet or “on-line” communications they prohibit.41
By comparison, other states use exhaustive lists of devices and methods
they prohibit.42
Reflecting a general unfamiliarity with the internet and crimes
committed therein, some legislatures opted for fewer, broader terms to
34. See Peter Palmer, Somebody To Talk To?, GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2001, 12:49 PM),
https://bit.ly/2qrIjwR; see also Judiciary Comm. on SB 495, supra note 31 (statement of
Governor John Lynch, New Hampshire) (explaining the need to prevent “sexual predators
[from hiding] in the shadows of cyberspace” and to “modernize [New Hampshire] laws to
protect [New Hampshire] children from the threats of the 21st century”).
35. See Judiciary Comm. on SB 495, supra note 31 (statement of Chief Richard
Gendron, Hudson Police Dept.) (testifying that “91% or seventy-seven million children
have access to the internet today” and “75% of these children have been aggressively
solicited” and he explained that he “d[id not] see this ever changing” but instead it would
only get worse).
36. MICHAEL L. JAMES ET AL., AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF THE PERCEIVED BENEFITS
OF ELECTRONIC BULLETIN BOARD USE AND THEIR IMPACT ON OTHER COMMUNICATION
ACTIVITIES 3 (1993), https://bit.ly/2znvAzu.
37. See Palmer, supra note 34.
38. Id. The author does not intend this statement to reflect a belief that only (or all)
55-year-olds are pedophiles.
39. See Albert J. Grudzinskas, New Technology Meets Old Law, in ADOLESCENT
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE DIGITAL AGE 1, 5–6 (Fabian M. Saleh et al. eds., 2014); see also
Judiciary Comm. on SB 495, supra note 31 (statement of Chief Richard Crate, Enfield
Police Dept.) (“[W]ith the creation of the internet, a whole new predator has emerged. New
technology has made it easier for these individuals to enter our homes and exploit our
children. The predators are using technology and the internet to lure and capture new
victims for their exploitation.”).
40. See ABA 50 State Survey, supra note 31.
41. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 649-B:4 (2009); see also FLA. STAT. § 847.0135
(2009).
42. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100.2(d)(1) (2007); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-6122 (2009).
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encompass a problem they did not fully understand.43 For example, New
Hampshire law prohibits any person from “knowingly utiliz[ing] a
computer on-line service, internet service, or local bulletin board service
to seduce, solicit, lure or entice a child” to commit sexual assault, indecent
exposure and lewdness, or endangering a child.44 Here, the electronic
means prohibited are both over- and under-inclusive, allowing courts the
discretion to apply either a narrow or broad application of the law.
Similar to the language of the New Hampshire statute,45 Florida law
largely prohibits the use of the same three electronic mediums for
soliciting children.46 Yet, the Florida statute slightly expands the list.47 In
Florida, a “person who knowingly uses a computer Internet service, local
bulletin board service, or any other device capable of electronic data
storage or transmission to: (a) Seduce, solicit, lure, or entice” a child to
engage in sexual conduct, violates Florida law.48 The inclusion of
“electronic data storage” devices allows the statute to incorporate a
broader range of technologies that may not yet be known–or even exist—
to fall within the statute’s control.
By stark contrast, states like Georgia and Alabama compiled more
thorough lists of the different communication methods the acts are meant
to encompass.49 For example, Georgia law prohibits the intentional or
willful use of “a computer wireless service or Internet service, including,
but not limited to, a local bulletin board service, Internet chat room, email, instant messaging service, or other electronic device, to seduce,
solicit, lure, or entice” a child to engage in sexual conduct.50 Unlike New
Hampshire or Florida, the terms employed by Georgia demonstrate an
attempt to draft a more pointed and specific law.
Even more expansive than the language in the Georgia statute,
Alabama law51 provides an extensive list of both the actions and
technologies the statute seeks to prohibit.52 First, the statute does not
merely address actions which “solicit, entice, or lure” children.53 The
Alabama statute instead prohibits any individual who “knowingly, with
the intent to commit an unlawful sex act, entices, induces, persuades,
seduces, prevails, advises, coerces, lures, or orders” a child to engage in
43. See ABA 50 State Survey, supra note 31.
44. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 649-B:4 (2009) (emphasis added).
45. See id.
46. See FLA. STAT. § 847.0135 (2009).
47. See id.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100.2(d)(1) (2007); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-6122 (2009).
50. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100.2(d)(1) (2007) (emphasis added).
51. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-122 (2009).
52. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100.2(d)(1) (2007); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-6122 (2009).
53. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100.2(d)(1). But see ALA. CODE § 13A-6-122 (2009).
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an illicit sexual act.54 Unlike New Hampshire, Florida, and even Georgia,
Alabama chose to encompass a wide array of actions in setting the scope
of child solicitation.55
Further, unlike most other states’ internet solicitation statutes,
Alabama’s statute bars a wide variety of specific technologies.56 The
statute prohibits the use of devices such as: “a computer, on-line service,
Internet service, Internet bulletin board service, weblog, cellular phone,
video game system, personal data assistant, telephone, facsimile machine,
camera, universal serial bus drive, writable compact disc, magnetic
storage device, floppy disk, or any other electronic communication or
storage device.”57 Unlike the New Hampshire, Florida, and Georgia
statutes, the Alabama statute’s nearly exhaustive list leaves less room for
error or ambiguity in the interpretation of internet solicitation. Notably,
however, a cautious Alabama legislature still includes a catch-all provision
at the end of the list to encompass any current or future technologies
unbeknownst to its members.58
3.

How We Understand the Internet: Then & Now

Since the enactment of internet solicitation statutes, technology and
the internet have dramatically changed.59 For example, in the early 2000s,
DSL technology60 increased the speed at which users could connect to the
internet.61 A thorough analysis of just how obsolete many of these internet
solicitation statutes have become relies on an understanding of the way
society understood technology, then and now.
a.

The Internet of the ‘80s, ‘90s, and 2000s

In 1980, CompuServe62 launched one of the “earliest commercial
Internet services” allowing users to sign onto their platform under
54. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-122 (2009) (emphasis added).
55. See id.
56. See ABA 50 State Survey, supra note 31.
57. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-122 (2009).
58. See id.
59. See Caitlin Dewey, A Complete History of the Rise and Fall—And
Reincarnation!—of the Beloved ‘90s Chatroom, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2014, 2:01 PM),
https://wapo.st/2RynhIp.
60. The acronym “DSL” stands for “Digital Subscriber Line” which refers to a
“networking technology that provides broadband (high-speed) Internet connections over
conventional telephone lines.” DSL: Networking Technology, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://bit.ly/2Drejaw (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
61. See Dewey, supra note 59.
62. CompuServe, then “the nation’s largest vendor of computer services, report[ed]
that its subscriber base [grew] . . . to well over 200,000 [people in 1985] . . . and offer[ed]
paid subscribers, among other things, a wide selection of what [were] commonly known as
electronic bulletin boards.” Martin Lasden, Of Bytes and Bulletin Boards, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 4, 1985), https://nyti.ms/2RQTc6C. “At CompuServe, there are close to 100 bulletin
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usernames that may (or may not) reflect characteristics about the user in
real life.63 Services like CompuServe, Prodigy,64 and America On-Line
(AOL),65 offered users what were known as “electronic bulletin boards.”66
Electronic bulletin boards were “computerized system[s] used to
exchange public messages or files.”67 These virtual platforms were
understood as electronic counterparts to “real” bulletin boards.68 Users
could “post” messages to be viewed by any member of the group.69
Messages posted on these “bulletin boards” were arranged in order “of
subject matter and removed when the quantity [of messages] overload[ed]
the system.”70 Although most of these messages and message-boards were
supervised by the chatroom service provider, conversations could also
occur in private chats that were not monitored or censored.71
More than ten years after CompuServe and other commercial internet
services launched, “on-line” communication was still new to the American
public.72 A 1993 Broadcast Education Association study revealed that “online communication [was] so new that few general communication
text[books] even mention[ed] its existence.”73 In fact, online
communication platforms did not reach peak usage until the mid-to-late1990s.74 Nonetheless, by 1997, AOL users “spent more than a million
boards to choose from . . . [and it is] even possible to ‘chat’ by computer with another
computer user live on the other end of the line.” Id.
63. See Dewey, supra note 59.
64. Prodigy was a “business information and product marketing service for the
Internet global web of computer networks.” Peter H. Lewis, Company News; Prodigy
Developing a Service for the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 1994),
https://nyti.ms/2sKINj2. The service operated at a time when the Internet was described as
a “loose affiliation of government, university and corporate computer networks on which
information is available free once someone gets access through an Internet host computer.”
Id.
65. AOL, also known as “America On-Line,” is “one of the largest Internet-access
subscription service companies in the United States, providing a range of Web services for
users.” AOL, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://bit.ly/2UeELLA (last visited Apr. 28,
2020).
66. See Dewey, supra note 59.
67. Bulletin-board system, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://bit.ly/2RvJruY (last
visited Apr. 28, 2020).
68. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 36, at 6; see also Peter Kerr, Now Computerized
Bulletin Boards, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 1982), https://nyti.ms/2MUIYBo (“Before
computers, there were cork bulletin boards . . . [t]his is just the electronic equivalent.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
69. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 36, at 6.
70. Id.
71. See Palmer, supra note 34. Chatrooms offered users a similar experience,
providing “online spaces where individuals possessing similar interests might congregate,
converse, and even share their physical locations to facilitate meeting in person.” Internet:
Computer Network, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://bit.ly/2E10aCl (last visited Apr.
28, 2020).
72. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 36, at 4.
73. Id.
74. See Dewey, supra note 59.
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hours chatting each day.”75 Despite the new and relatively unfamiliar
nature of these communication platforms, they quickly developed a
reputation for their “shady, transgressive” possibilities.76
b.

Modern Understanding

In the decades since the launch and use of electronic bulletin-board
systems, the way people accessed and interacted on the internet changed
tremendously.77 One important change that sparked a new understanding
of technology and the internet was the launch of social networking or
“social media” websites.78 Websites like Friendster,79 Myspace,80 and
Facebook81 soon spelled disaster for the once popular chatrooms.82 Unlike
the electronic bulletin boards and chatrooms of the 1990s, in which
anonymity was central to the fun and mystique of the platform,83 modern
social websites appeal to users for the opposite reason.84 On these new
platforms “[w]ho you are in real life is frequently . . . the only thing that
matters.”85 This emphasis on a person’s real identity when communicating
online86 is an important distinction from the way internet communication
was understood in the 1990s and 2000s.87
A comparison of the websites frequented by modern internet users
and the terms of these internet solicitation statutes themselves exemplifies
the drastically different understanding of the internet at the time of drafting
than in the modern age. During the 1990s, when many states adopted

75. Id.
76. See id.
77. See id.; see also Judiciary Comm. on SB 495, supra note 31 (statement of Chief
Richard Gendron, Hudson Police Dept.) (noting the ongoing changes in technology and
explaining that in 2008, the Hudson Police Department was “now seeing text messages”
arise in addition to traditional communications over the computer).
78. See Dewey, supra note 59.
79. Friendster is a popular “online social network” that enables “people to stay in
touch with friends, family, school, social groups, activities, and interests, as well as to
discover new people and things that are important to them.” Friendster Company
Overview, BLOOMBERG, https://bloom.bg/2sHnrmn (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
80. Myspace is a popular “online community portal” that allows “users to create a
private community where they can share photos, journals, music, and other online media.”
Myspace Inc, BLOOMBERG, https://bloom.bg/2yWvUsf (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
81. Facebook is a “social networking website” that “allows people to communicate
with their family, friends, and coworkers.” Facebook Inc, BLOOMBERG,
https://bloom.bg/2VIwbbj (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
82. See Dewey, supra note 59.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. Id. But see Jack Nicas, Oprah, Is That You? On Social Media, the Answer is Often
No, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2KWRelO (noting how easy it is to make
fake accounts on social media websites, and how difficult these accounts can be for the
companies themselves to remove).
86. See Dewey, supra note 59.
87. See Palmer, supra note 34.
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legislation to address issues of the internet, legislatures used terms such as
“local bulletin board services” to describe the breadth of prohibited
activities.88 Legislatures seemed to have used the phrase “local bulletin
board services” to refer to the popular medium of internet communication
in the 1990s: the chatroom. However, in the digital age, a phrase such as
“local bulletin board services” has reached such a level of obsolescence in
modern technology that it effectively prohibits an activity that no longer
exists.89
B.

Sex Offender Registration

Although well-intentioned when enacted, these outdated internet
solicitation statutes have become a threat to modern teens navigating the
nuances of sexual relationships in the digital age. When state internet
solicitation statutes do not identify offenders as adults, adolescents
communicating with their peers (children in the eyes of the law) can
become swept up like “by-catch.”90 Understanding the threat internet
solicitation statutes pose to adolescents for their online communications
first requires an examination of the introduction of juveniles into the sex
offender registration system.
1.

Before the ‘90s: A Brief History

The evolution of sex offender registration statutes91 began in the
decades prior to the 1990s.92 Although the punishment93 of sexual
offenders in society was not a novel concept in the early twentieth century,
the laws of the United States during this period marked the codification of
the societal distaste for sex offenders.94 Legislation categorizing and
establishing punishment for sex offenders characterized much of the 1930s
88. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 649-B:4 (2009); see also FLA. STAT. § 847.0135
(2009).
89. See Dewey, supra note 59.
90. The term “by-catch” or “bycatch” refers to “the portion of a commercial fishing
catch that consists of marine animals caught unintentionally.” Bycatch, MERRIAMWEBSTER, https://bit.ly/2Oracin (last visited Apr. 28, 2020). Here, the term “by-catch” is
meant to refer to the unintentional nature of a widely applicable statute (like a large fishing
net) as it applies to people (like fish) it did not mean to include.
91. For the purposes of this Comment, the phrase “sex offender registration statutes”
is used to encompass an array of different statutes that target and regulate the behavior of
sex offenders in the United States. Primarily this phrase references statutes that impose
requirements of registration, community notification, and residency restriction. See Parker
& Pittman, supra note 25, at 11.
92. See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 23, at 51.
93. The author recognizes that courts have held that sex offender registration itself
does not constitute a punishment. See, e.g., Johnson v. Dep’t of Justice, 341 P.3d 1075
(Cal. 2015); People ex rel. J.T., 13 P.3d 321 (Colo. App. 2000). However, in the context
of this Comment, the author will refer to sex offender registration as a punishment,
especially as it is applied to juveniles engaged in consensual peer sexual relationships.
94. See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 23, at 51.
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and 1940s.95 Similar to the rise of cases that evoked public outrage and
legislation in the 1990s, “emotionally charged cases of sexual abuse
against children [led] to strict policies against sex offenders in the
1930s.”96
Beginning in 1937 with the state of Michigan, many states began to
implement what was termed “mentally disordered sex offender” (MDSO)
legislation.97 These laws stemmed from the societal belief that “sexual
psychopathy was a disorder that could be diagnosed and treated.”98 At the
same time, Florida became the first state to pass legislation “that required
[sex] offenders of all types to register their addresses with law enforcement
and agencies upon criminal convictions in an effort to prevent
reoffending.”99
In the decades following the enactment of MDSO laws, the United
States also began changing the way it viewed victims of sexual violence.100
Prior to the 1970s, for example, there was a “prevailing negative view of
victims of sexual violence” such that most people “viewed the victims of
sexual abuse as partially or primarily responsible for their
victimization.”101 Starting with the feminist movement in the 1970s,
however, the focus shifted to the perpetrator and away from the victim.102
2.

Sex Offender Registration: ‘80s to Today

This shift in focus from the victim to the perpetrator was compounded
by the emergence of multiple high-profile sexual offenses in the 1990s.103
In response to this wave of salacious crimes, Washington became the first
state to enact legislation requiring convicted sex offenders to register on a
public registry in 1990.104 Many states across the nation, and even the
federal government, quickly followed suit. The 1990s thus began a shift to
more stringent restrictions on sex offenders in an effort to provide greater
protection for children.105 The three most notable examples of such 1990s
95. See id. at 59.
96. Id. at 53.
97. Id. at 52. MDSO laws offered states a way to “civilly commit sex offenders until
they were ‘cured.’” Id. Yet, civil commitment for these offenders was not popular for long
and, by the late 1940s, was widely opposed by many researchers. See id. at 53.
98. Id. at 52.
99. Mary K. Evans et al., Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification, in
SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS 142 (Richard G. Wright ed., 2d
ed. 2015) (“This law used registration to target persons convicted of felonies ‘involving
moral turpitude.’”).
100. See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 23, at 53–54.
101. Id. at 53.
102. See id. at 54.
103. See id. at 55.
104. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (2005); see also Terry & Ackerman,
supra note 23, at 57.
105. See Sex Offender Registration and Notification: Research Finds Limited Effects
in New Jersey, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE (Jan. 21, 2009), https://bit.ly/2RDOjyr.
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legislation, known by the names of the children they seek to remember,
include: the Jacob Wetterling Act,106 Megan’s Law,107 and the Adam
Walsh Act.108
First, the United States Congress (Congress) enacted the Jacob
Wetterling Act to remember Jacob Wetterling, an eleven-year-old boy
who was killed by a “strange” man with a gun while biking home.109 After
the death of their son, Jacob’s family started a foundation to protect
children from sexual exploitation.110 The Wetterlings pushed for
Minnesota to enact a state sex offender law and later lobbied Congress to
do the same.111 Nearly five years after Jacob’s murder, in 1994, Congress
finally passed the first set of federal sex offender laws and enacted the
Jacob Wetterling Act.112 The act was “intended to help stem the
international trafficking in sexually exploited children, and to strengthen
efforts to prevent the sexual abuse of children.”113 In furtherance of these
goals, the act “prohibit[ed] both domestic interstate and foreign travel for
the purpose of engaging in a sexual act with a person under 18 years of
age.”114 Although the Jacob Wetterling Act was a federal law, Congress
encouraged states without existing registration requirements to integrate
the act into state law by linking state compliance with its terms to the
continued receipt of federal funds.115
Generally, the act required states to implement programs under which
persons “convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor
or who is convicted of a sexually violent offense to register a current
address with a designated State law enforcement agency.”116 The
requirement to register with law enforcement once out of prison, or on
parole, stemmed from a belief that sex offenders had an extremely high

106. See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071–73 (repealed 2006).
107. See Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996), repealed and
replaced by Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
120 Stat. 587 (2006).
108. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–91 (2018).
109. See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 23, at 57.
110. See id. (explaining that “many [people] assume[d] that [Jacob’s killer] was one
of the sex offenders living in a halfway house” in the neighborhood).
111. See Tanya Rivera, How Jacob Wetterling’s Case Changed Sex Offender Registry
Laws, WFMY NEWS 2 (Sept. 5, 2016, 7:47 PM), https://on.wfmy.com/2FVl9YU.
112. See Richard A. Paladino, Note, The Adam Walsh Act as Applied to Juveniles:
One Size Does Not Fit All, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 269, 274 (2011); see also 42 U.S.C. §§
14071–73 (repealed 2006).
113. H.R. REP. NO. 103-469, 2d Sess., at 1 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), available at
https://bit.ly/3g2kww9.
114. Id.
115. See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 23, at 57 (noting the act required all states to
comply with some level of sex offender registration in order to maintain 10% of the federal
funds received from the Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act).
116. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071–73 (repealed 2006).
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rate of recidivism.117 With the continuing abuse of children, however,
some people felt that these sex offender registration statutes did not go far
enough to adequately protect children.118
In fact, that same year another brutal child-abuse case shocked the
country: Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old girl, was raped and murdered.119
The search for the rapist-murderer revealed he was a neighbor and a twotime convicted sex offender.120 The news of an unknown, recidivist sexual
predator living nearby sparked a public outcry for community notification
of registered sex offenders.121 In response to this outcry, in 1996, Congress
passed a second federal sex offender law: Megan’s Law.122 With the
adoption of Megan’s Law, Congress required states to publicize sex
offender registry information.123
Accordingly, Megan’s Law required “local law enforcement
authorities to notify neighbors about a sex offender’s presence in their
community.”124 The wide adoption of “Megan’s Laws” by the states
illustrated a national consensus that a process to “register, publicize and
monitor sex offenders” was the best solution to deal with these “uniquely
horrific” crimes.125 But the passage of the Jacob Wetterling Act and
Megan’s Law were not enough to assuage the fears of American parents.
Ten years after the enactment of Megan’s Law, Congress passed a
much stricter set of federal regulations for sex offenders: The Adam Walsh
Act.126 In 1981, Adam Walsh, a six-year-old boy, was abducted while
shopping at a Florida mall with his mother and later killed.127 In response
to the death of their son, Adam’s parents created a missing children
outreach center to lobby for the Missing Children’s Act, which was

117. See Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification:
Past, Present, and Future, 34 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 56, 56–57 (2008).
118. See, e.g., Terry & Ackerman, supra note 23, at 57. After Maureen Kanka, Megan
Kanka’s mother, found out her daughter’s murderer was a “recidivist pedophile” and “lived
with two other child sexual abusers,” Maureen and her husband “wondered how recidivist
sex offenders were living in the community without the community’s knowledge.” Id.
Thus, she “went on a crusade to change the laws arguing that registration, established by
the Wetterling act, was not a sufficient form of community notification.” Id.
119. See Paladino, supra note 112, at 276.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 23, at 57.
123. See Elizabeth J. Letourneau et al., Effects of Juvenile Sex Offender Registration
on Adolescent Well-Being: An Empirical Examination, 24 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 105,
105 (2018), available at https://bit.ly/2DmOV7d.
124. Roger N. Lancaster, Sex Offenders: The Last Pariahs, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20,
2011), https://nyti.ms/1LeIIsF.
125. See id. (noting the “abduction, rape, and murder of children” is actually
“exceedingly rare”).
126. See Paladino, supra note 112, at 277; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–97 (2018).
127. See Olivia B. Waxman, The U.S. is Still Dealing with the Murder of Adam
Walsh, TIME (Aug. 10, 2016), http://time.com/4437205/adam-walsh-murder/.
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enacted in 1982.128 Although widely known as the “Adam Walsh Act” for
the child it remembers, the act is more often referred to by the first title of
the act, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).129
Prior to the enactment of SORNA in 2006, juveniles were not
considered equal to adult sex offenders in their requirements to register
and notify the communities in which they lived.130 On the contrary,
juveniles who committed sex offenses were “not a high priority in the
[initial] registration and notification legislation” enacted.131
SORNA thus marked a change in priorities of registration legislation.
SORNA provides that “juveniles can be equated with adult sex offenders
regarding registration and notification requirements.”132 SORNA thus
requires “juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent as a result of
committing aggravated sexual abuse and were fourteen years of age or
older at the time to submit to community notification.”133 Further, SORNA
introduced a new system of classifying offenders.134 SORNA provided that
the classification (risk level) of sex offenders would be determined solely
by the crime of conviction, without taking into account any individualized
risk factors.135 This major change to the consequences for a child or
juvenile sex offender occurred during an equally transformative time for
these individuals: the increased use of the internet.
C.

Increased Use of the Internet

The years since the launch of CompuServe in the 1980s marked the
categorical increase in computer and internet use by adults and adolescents
alike.136 Between 1993 and 2007, telecommunications carried by the
internet increased from 1% to 97%.137 Both adults and children contributed

128. See id.; see also Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, Pub. L. No.
109-248, 120 Stat. 590 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42
U.S.C.).
129. See Paladino, supra note 112, at 271.
130. See Francis M. Williams, The Problem of Sexual Assault, in SEX OFFENDER
LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS 30 (Richard G. Wright ed., 2d ed. 2015).
131. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY 147 (Franklin E. Zimring ed.
2004).
132. Williams, supra note 130, at 30.
133. Paladino, supra note 112, at 271. SORNA also requires registration for crimes
that in some jurisdictions may not even constitute a sexual offense. See Parker & Pittman,
supra note 25, at 13. This broad list of offenses includes: indecent exposure, kidnapping,
false imprisonment of a child, public urination, rape, incest, indecency with a child by
touching, and possession of child pornography. See id.
134. See Parker & Pittman, supra note 25, at 13
135. See id.
136. See Andrew J. Harris, Understanding the World of Digital Youth, in
ADOLESCENT SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE DIGITAL AGE, 24, 25 (Fabian M. Saleh et al. eds.,
2014).
137. Id.
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to this rapid and remarkable increase in internet use.138 Although the
increased use of digital technologies has “surely altered the norms,
attitudes, and behaviors” of adults, the internet has “fundamentally shaped
and defined those of teens and young adults coming of age in the new
millennium.”139
In less than two decades, the internet became a ubiquitous presence
in child and adolescent life.140 In 1984, “27 [%] of students (from prekindergarten through college) used computers at school.”141 Within just
five years this “number had increased to 43 [%].”142 By 2001, “[a]bout 90
[%] of children and adolescents ages 5 [to] 17 (47 million persons) use[d]
computers, and about 59 [%] (31 million persons) use[d] the internet.”143
As more children and adolescents frequented the internet, at school and at
home, it offered an “easy and inexpensive” means of communication.144
In fact, a 2003 study found that both boys and girls “reported devoting
most of their online time to private communication.”145 The study also
noted that “[t]he most commonly reported and time-consuming activity
among participants was instant messaging.”146
Over the last decade, adolescent use of the internet continues to surge.
Most recently, a 2018 study revealed that “[s]ome 45% of teens say they
use the internet ‘almost constantly.’”147 Further, the study found that
“roughly nine-in-ten teens go online at least multiple times per day.”148 As
a result of this increase in internet usage, society has dramatically changed
the “way we consume [information], access information, and interact with
one another.”149 The shift in adolescent communication from the “real
world” to the “virtual world” is thus a critical component to the analysis
of the intersection between internet solicitation statutes and the inclusion
of juveniles on sex offender registries in recent years.

138. See id. at 27.
139. Id.
140. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, COMPUTER AND
INTERNET USE BY CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN 2001: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS REPORT 3
(2003) [hereinafter COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE BY CHILDREN 2001].
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Janis Wolak et al., Close Online Relationships in a National Sample of
Adolescents, 37 ADOLESCENCE 441, 453 (2002).
145. Eliseva F. Gross, Adolescent Internet use: What we expect, what teens report,
25 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 633, 642 (2004).
146. Id. at 641.
147. Monica Anderson & Jinjin Jiang, Teens, Social Media & Technology: 2018, PEW
RES. CTR.: INTERNET & TECH. (May 31, 2018), https://pewrsr.ch/2L9CBbf.
148. Id.
149. Harris, supra note 136, at 24.
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Adolescent Romance in the Digital Age

The pervasive use of the internet for communication between
adolescents has also changed the way adolescents explore sexual
relationships. Given its increased access and use, the internet has become
a “key conduit” for adolescents to explore their “emerging sexuality.”150
Even adolescents themselves describe technology-especially social
media-as “an integral part of the courting process.”151
In recent years, the increased use of social networks means that nearly
every stage of adolescent relationships is now frequently shared online.152
Adolescents update their social networks by changing their social media
profiles to reflect their relationship statuses.153 Everything from flirting to
the status of an adolescent’s relationship occurs in the context of social
media.154 In a Pew Research Center study, about half of the adolescents
questioned reported they “have expressed their attraction by liking,
commenting or otherwise interacting with [their crushes] on social
media.”155 As digital communications “play a role[] in all aspects of teen
relationships,”156 adolescents also use the internet to begin communicating
sexual desires rather than merely flirting with their crushes.157 Adolescents
who use digital technology to communicate these interests may, therefore,
find themselves subject to their state’s respective internet solicitation
statutes.
E.

Electronic Solicitation Statutes in the Digital Era

The intersection of adolescent communication, sexual relationships,
and the internet leave the question of whether internet solicitation statutes
encompass these adolescent communications. Answering this question
requires an examination of how the courts interpret these statutes. One of
the only courts to explicitly address the issue, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the interplay between internet
solicitation and sex offender registration statutes, provides a basis for
understanding the modern application of these laws.158
150. See Christopher W. Racine & Stephen Bates Billick, Conclusion:
Understanding Adolescent Sexual Development and the Law in the Digital Era, in
ADOLESCENT SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE DIGITAL AGE 346, 348 (Fabian M. Saleh et al. eds.,
2014).
151. Dating in the Digital Age, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 1, 2015),
https://pewrsr.ch/1KMpM1E.
152. See Harris, supra note 136, at 38.
153. See id.
154. See Dating in the Digital Age, supra note 151.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. To the extent no cases were on point in Florida, Georgia, or Alabama, the author
assumes that courts in these jurisdictions have not yet contemplated the intersection of
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New Hampshire

In May of 2018, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire addressed the
interplay between the state’s internet solicitation statute and juvenile sex
offender registration requirements in State v. Serpa.159 In Serpa, the
defendant was 18 years old when he “use[d] a computer as a medium to
propose sex” with the 15-year-old victim.160 On appeal, the defendant
challenged the imposition of the sex offender registration requirement for
his internet solicitation conviction because state law did not mandate
registration for the underlying charge of sexual assault.161
For sexual assault, New Hampshire law provides an age-based
exception to the sex offender registration requirement.162 This exception
also lessens the offense of sexual assault from a felony to a
misdemeanor.163 Because New Hampshire only mandates sex offender
registration for felony sexual assault cases, this exception negates the
registration requirement of offenders when the “age difference between
the defendant and the victim is ‘4 years or less’ and the victim is ‘13 years
of age or older and under 16 years of age.’”164
The court rejected the defendant’s argument and found that the agebased exception did not extend to the conviction for the internet
solicitation charge.165 The court clarified that the “unambiguous language
of the statutes” indicated that this age gap exemption applied only to the
underlying offense of sexual assault and did not extend to the offense of
internet solicitation.166
In holding that the age-based exception to registration did not extend
to the internet solicitation offense, the court relied on the legislative intent
underlying the internet solicitation statute.167 The court noted that “[t]he
internet solicitation and juvenile sex offender registration in the digital age. Accordingly,
an analysis of the implementation of these statutes in Florida, Georgia, and Alabama is not
possible here.
159. See State v. Serpa, 187 A.3d 107, 108 (N.H. 2018).
160. Id. Notably, the defendant in this case was 18 years old, and therefore would not
be considered a juvenile at the time of the offense. Thus, for the purposes of this Comment,
his age will be analyzed for its close relation to the age of the victim (as peers) rather than
his status as a juvenile offender.
161. See id.
162. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:4 (2018) (“A person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor . . . when the actor engages in sexual penetration with a person, other than
the actor’s legal spouse, who is 13 years of age or older and under 16 years of age where
the age difference between the actor and the other person is 4 years or less . . . [however,
a] person found guilty under subparagraph I(c) of this section shall not be required to
register as a sexual offender.”).
163. See id.
164. Serpa, 187 A.3d at 108; see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:4(I)(c) (2018).
165. See Serpa, 187 A.3d at 110.
166. See id. (emphasizing that the two laws “criminalize[d] separate and distinct
conduct”).
167. See id. at 111.
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legislature viewed individuals who use computer online services or
internet services to seduce or solicit children to engage in certain sexual
activities as particularly dangerous.”168 Thus, the court was reluctant to
extend any exceptions to the serious punishment intended by the
legislature, even for adolescents close in age.169
Significantly, the court recognized that the change in times between
the drafting and application of the state’s internet solicitation statute might
call for a revision of the state’s laws.170 The court noted that “given the
changes in how young people communicate today, the reasons for the
distinction drawn by the [registration requirements for the sexual assault
and internet solicitation statutes] may be diminishing.”171 In upholding the
sex offender registration requirement for internet solicitation between
adolescent peers, the court deferred to the authority of the legislature to
make the appropriate changes to the law.172
F.

The “Problem” of Youth versus Adult Offenders

What the New Hampshire Supreme Court recognized in Serpa is a
novel issue presented by internet solicitation statutes in a time when sex
offender registries include juveniles.173 The interaction of internet
solicitation statutes and juvenile sex offender registration presents the
question of whether the legislature intended to encompass both adult and
juvenile offenders. Further, this interplay prompts the question of whether
adult and juvenile offenders should be punished the same way.
1.

The Supreme
Amendment

Court,

Juveniles, and the Eighth

Although the Supreme Court of the United States has not yet
answered the question of whether sex offender registration requirements
should differ between juveniles and adults,174 the Court has indicated that
these demographics warrant different treatment for severe punishments. In
the early 2000s, the Supreme Court decided three precedential cases
establishing a constitutional difference between adolescents and adults as
to sentencing or punishment.175 Of the three cases, the Supreme Court first
168. Id. (citing State v. Farrington, 20 A.3d 291 (N.H. 2011)).
169. See id.
170. See id. at 112.
171. Id.
172. See id. (“[I]f changes are to be made [to reflect the change in how adolescents
communicate in the digital age], the task is that of the legislature, not this court.”).
173. See id. (noting “the changes in how young people communicate today”).
174. See United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 938 (2011) (declining to reach
the merits of the constitutionality of juvenile sex offender registration, noting the Ninth
Circuit also lacked authority to do so).
175. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460, 471 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
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considered the constitutionality of imposing capital punishment on
juveniles in Roper v. Simmons.176
In Roper, the Supreme Court held that imposing the death penalty on
juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.177 The Court emphasized that adolescent offenders
differ from their adult counterparts in three critical ways: maturity,
susceptibility to outside pressure, and character development.178 Thus, the
Court held the “Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of
the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their
crimes were committed.”179
Since Roper, the Court has continued to uphold the distinction
between adolescent and adult offenders. In Graham v. Florida,180 the
Court considered whether imposing a life-without-parole sentence on
juveniles was constitutional.181 In Graham, the Court emphasized that
“developments in psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”182 Because of
these fundamental differences between adolescents and adults, the Court
held that life sentences without the possibility of parole, as applied to
juveniles, violated the Eighth Amendment.183
Further, in the 2012 case Miller v. Alabama,184 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that juveniles “are constitutionally different from adults . . .
[b]ecause juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for
reform.”185 There, the Court stated that juveniles are “less deserving of
the most severe punishments.”186 Further, “[n]o recent data provide[s]
reason to reconsider the Court's observations in Roper about the nature of
juveniles.”187 Accordingly, legislatures should consider the fundamental
differences between adult and adolescent offenders when administering
punishments with lifelong consequences.
2.

Juvenile Brain Development

As recognized by the Supreme Court, the constitutional difference
between juvenile and adult offenders stems from a fundamental difference

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
Id. at 578.
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
See id.
Id.
See id.
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012).
Id.
Id.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.
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in brain development.188 Studies on juvenile brain development confirm
that “children, including teenagers, act more irrationally and immaturely
than adults.”189 These irrational or immature decisions are often due to a
greater tendency in children to “make decisions based on emotions, such
as anger or fear, rather than logic and reason.”190
For adolescents, in particular, poor decision-making is due in part to
a “present-oriented” line of thinking that “tends to ignore, discount, or not
fully understand future outcomes and implications.”191 Generally,
“reasoning capabilities increase through childhood into adolescence and
younger teens differ substantially from adults in their cognitive
abilities.”192 Despite these basic biological and psychological
characteristics of adolescent decision-making, some scholars are reluctant
to use these traits to excuse juveniles for their indiscretions and crimes.193
This reluctance stems, in part, from a desire to foster the empowerment of
adolescents in decisions impacting their own lives.194 Some of these critics
often “assert[] that, by mid-adolescence, teens’ capacities for
understanding and reasoning in making decisions roughly approximate
those of adults.”195
Yet, the evolution of these cognitive and psychosocial skills plays a
critical role in shaping the choices—even criminal choices—of
adolescents.196 This difference in cognitive ability fundamentally
distinguishes adolescents from adults.197 The continuing development of
these decision-making skills also reflects the fact that adolescent criminal
behavior is less likely to reflect bad behavior, compared to similar
behavior from an adult.198
3.

Undermining the Juvenile Justice System

Beyond ignoring basic biological differences between adults and
juveniles, lifetime sex offender registration requirements on adolescents
belie the purpose of the juvenile justice system. Separating juvenile and
adult courts sought to provide “rehabilitative alternatives to juveniles.”199
188. See supra Section II.F.1.
189. Parker & Pittman, supra note 25, at 17.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence,
58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1011 (2003) (internal citation omitted).
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. Id. These critics likely fear a minimalization of adolescent brain development to
the extent that “advocates for adolescent self-determination made this argument in support
of adolescent abortion rights.” Id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See Paladino, supra note 112, at 286.
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The Supreme Court also acknowledged rehabilitation to distinguish
juvenile and adult offenders in its decisions in Graham and Miller.200
In Graham, the Court noted that juveniles are “more capable of
change than are adults” and thus juveniles’ actions “are less likely to be
evidence of irretrievably depraved character.”201 Similarly, in Miller, the
Court emphasized that courts imposing the “harshest penalties or
sentences” on juveniles “cannot proceed as though they were not
children.”202 Although the Court in Miller specifically addressed the
harshness of imposing life-without-parole sentences on a juvenile
compared to an adult, imposing lifetime sex offender registration on
juveniles is likewise harsh compared to the same requirement for adults.
4.

Recidivism

Juvenile and adult offenders also differ in their respective rates of
recidivism. First, notably, studies show that recidivism rates among sex
offenders are significantly lower compared to other criminal offenders.203
This statistic presents a stark contrast to the belief that sex offenders
include some of the most dangerous, reoffending criminals in our
communities.204
A comparison of the rates of recidivism for adult and juvenile sex
offenders demonstrates an even lower likelihood of reoffending among
juveniles.205 On the one hand, research has shown a recidivism rate of 13%
for adults who commit sex offenses.206 On the other hand, the recidivism
rates for youth sex offenders average between 4% and 7%.207 In fact, most
juveniles convicted of sex offenses will not go on to commit these crimes
as adults.208 Further, “no scientific foundation [exists] for the belief that
children who commit sexual offenses pose a danger of future sexual
predation.”209 Accordingly, there is no statistical support for the argument
that juvenile lifetime sex offender registration makes our communities
safer.

200. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); see also Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460, 474 (2012).
201. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
202. Miller, 567 U.S. at 474.
203. See Lancaster, supra note 124; see also Parker & Pittman, supra note 25, at 19
(comparing the national recidivism rate of 40% for all criminal offenses with the recidivism
rate of 13% for adult sex offenders).
204. See Parker & Pittman, supra note 25, at 19.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See Williams, supra note 130, at 30.
209. Parker & Pittman, supra note 25, at 17.
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Lifetime Implications

Another major difference between punishments imposed on juveniles
and adults is that the juvenile will “almost inevitably serve more years and
a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.”210
Accordingly, the imposition of a lifelong penalty on both adults and
juveniles is “the same . . . in name only.”211
Depending on the state and the nature of the underlying crime, the
impacts of sex offender registration on adolescents can follow them for the
rest of their lives.212 In many states, these adolescents will face laws that
restrict where they can “live, work or walk.”213 Additionally, the inclusion
of offenders’ names and personal information on online registries can
equate to public stockyards and “digital scarlet letters” for adults—but
especially children.214
With the dissemination of juvenile offenders’ names and personal
information online, the stigma of their offense can follow them
anywhere.215 This pervasive stigmatization can do “profound damage to a
child’s development and self-esteem.”216 Additionally, this stigma “lead[s]
to fear or mistrust by others, suspicion, rejection, or isolation from family
and friends.”217 By subjecting adolescents to long-term humiliation and
social barriers, registration “exacerbates the psychological difficulties they
already experience.”218
Because of registration, juveniles experience a prolonged stigma with
potentially violent or even deadly effects. In a recent Human Rights Watch
report, 52% of interviewed juvenile offenders “experienced violence or
threats of violence” both against themselves and family members.219
Further, this constant humiliation and social rejection have led many
juvenile offenders to attempt death by suicide—some of whom were
successful.220 The severe consequences of a juvenile’s sex offender

210. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 475 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
211. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. See Lancaster, supra note 124.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See Parker & Pittman, supra note 25, at 29. This widely accessible information
can lead to the proliferation of the labels “sex offender,” “child molester,” or “sexually
violent predator.” Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. The author recognizes that the dissemination of this personal information is
arguably the intent of the registry itself, however, the psychological impact of these labels
is troubling when applied to juveniles engaged in consensual sexual relationships, as
opposed to sexual predators.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 33.
220. See id. at 30.
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registration are onerous and unwarranted, especially given the
rehabilitative nature of youth.221
III. ANALYSIS
As technology continues to progress in the digital age, the issue of
juvenile sex offender registration is becoming increasingly problematic.
An understanding of the changes to the internet, communication, and sex
offender registration provides a means of evaluating how the intersection
of these laws poses a threat to adolescent sexual relationships.
A.

Internet Solicitation Statutes are Digital Dinosaurs

Unfortunately for teens navigating sexual relationships in the digital
age, internet solicitation laws have not aged well.222 The continued use of
outdated internet solicitation statutes ignores the fact that the internet in
the digital age is unrecognizable compared to the internet of the 1980s and
1990s.223 Accordingly, the language used to describe the early years of the
internet is no longer adequate to address the way adults, teens, or children
engage with the internet today.224
The language legislatures employed in these internet solicitation
statutes disregards the fact that the internet is not special anymore. When
initially drafted, internet solicitation statutes addressed the novel issue of
internet communication.225 Today,226 however, communicating over the
internet is not a novel concept.227 On the contrary, adolescents use the
internet “almost constantly.”228
With this pervasive use of the internet to communicate, internet
solicitation laws effectively punish an adolescent’s choice to use the
internet rather than another communication channel to engage in

221. See supra Section II.F.3.
222. See State v. Serpa, 187 A.3d 107, 108 (N.H. 2018).
223. See supra Section II.C.; cf. Judiciary Comm. on SB 495, supra note 31
(statement of Chief Richard Gendron, Hudson Police Department) (emphasizing the
importance of “keep[ing] the laws up to date with technology”).
224. See supra Section II.A.3.b.
225. See COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE BY CHILDREN 2001, supra note 140; see also
JAMES ET AL., supra note 36, at 4.
226. The term “today” is meant to reflect the time of writing (2020) and the digital
age more broadly.
227. See Anderson & Jiang, supra note 147.
228. See id.
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consensual,229 peer sexual relationships today.230 Punishing adolescents
for internet-based communication thus implies there is something
inherently more dangerous about e-mail than a landline.231 Because
internet solicitation statutes were not originally drafted with such an
intent;232 courts and legislatures must rectify the way these statutes are
applied to adolescents communicating on the internet.
B.

The New Problem of Juvenile Sex Offenders

To effectively modify internet solicitation statutes, legislatures must
address both adolescents’ pervasive use of the internet233 and the inclusion
of adolescents on sex offender registries.234 Legislatures drafting internet
solicitation statutes also did not consider adolescent sexual exploration
over the internet or even adolescent internet communication at all.235 The
absence of language limiting the offense to adults236 underscores this
ignorance of adolescent internet communication. Without limiting
language, juveniles are thus susceptible to violating the law as they
navigate consensual sexual relationships via the internet.237
When internet solicitation laws were first employed, legislators could
not have conceived of their use against juveniles.238 When legislatures
drafted these internet solicitation statutes, “[t]he juvenile sex offender was
not a high priority.”239 Imposing sex offender registration on juveniles for
violating internet solicitation statutes, thus highlights the need to
reconsider whom these statutes should target.240
C.

The Constitutional Difference Between Adolescents and

229. Here, the use of the term “consensual” is meant to reference sexual acts to which
both parties agree. For the purpose of this proposed modification, the term consensual does
not bear its legal meaning, which would only grant the power to consent to older
adolescents or adults. The author uses this term to differentiate between sexual advances
that are wanted and those that are unwanted. In the latter case, the author would propose
that no such similar-age provision bar the imposition of sex offender status on the offender.
230. In other words, the punishment for adolescent peer communication over the
internet serves to punish the act of using the internet rather than a deterrence of an improper
relationship: the sexual relationship between an adult and child.
231. See supra Section II.A.1.
232. See supra Section II.A.1.
233. See supra Section II.C.
234. See supra Section II.B.2.
235. See Parker & Pittman, supra note 25, at 4 (“When first adopted, registration laws
neither required nor prohibited [the] inclusion of youth sex offenders.”).
236. See supra Section II.A.2.
237. See supra Section II.D.
238. See Parker & Pittman, supra note 25, at 4; see also supra Section II.A.1.
239. ZIMRING, supra note 131, at 147.
240. See State v. Serpa, 187 A.3d 107, 112 (N.H. 2018) (noting “the changes in how
young people communicate today” as potential grounds for modifying the law).
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Adults
Differences in adult and adolescent culpability, rehabilitation, and
recidivism further illustrate how internet solicitation statutes do not
adequately address the conduct they seek to prohibit.241 Although the
Supreme Court has not yet answered the constitutional question of lifetime
sex offender registration for juveniles, the Court has repeatedly upheld the
constitutional difference between adolescents and adults in terms of the
proper punishment for each demographic.242 The recognition of
constitutional differences between juveniles and adults in terms of
punishment triggers the need to reform state internet solicitation statutes.
If any statute fails to discriminate between juvenile and adult offenders in
terms of punishment, a threat to juvenile freedom everywhere remains.243
D.

Recommendations

States can correct the problem of encompassing adolescents as bycatch of these internet solicitation statutes by three means.244 Ideally, state
legislatures should revise internet solicitation statutes to narrow the
methods prohibited and clarify the age of offenders.245 States should also
grant judges the discretion to refrain from imposing sex offender status on
adolescents found in violation of internet solicitation statutes.246 For states
that continue to require juveniles to register as sex offenders, they should
adopt a meaningful appellate process in the case of lifetime registration
requirements.247
1.

Revise Statutes to Address Methods Prohibited and the
Age of the Offender

The best solution to the impermissible interplay of internet
solicitation statutes and juvenile sex offender registration is for state
legislatures to amend their respective statutes to reflect the internet as used

241. See supra Section II.F.
242. See supra Section II.F.1.
243. See Paladino, supra note 112, at 295. The variable state registration requirements
can pose an additional problem to juveniles who later move to another state. See id. For
example, a juvenile who pleads guilty to an offense in one state that does not require sex
offender registration but later moves to a state like New Jersey, will be required to register
as a sex offender for qualifying offenses if they “move to, become employed, or attend
school in New Jersey.” Id.
244. The author recognizes that these proposed solutions all face one major obstacle:
community apprehension to reform sex offender legislation generally. Even advocates of
criminal justice reform are reluctant to speak about—let alone reform—sex offender laws.
See Lancaster, supra note 124.
245. See supra Section II.A.1.
246. See supra Section II.B.2.
247. See supra Section II.F.3.
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in the digital age.248 As the New Hampshire Supreme Court noted in Serpa,
state legislatures are in a better position than the courts to reflect societal
changes—like the pervasive nature of adolescent internet
communication—in the law.249
In revising internet solicitation statutes, legislatures should first
address the target age of offenders.250 The ideal statute would provide an
age minimum for offenders. For example, legislatures may decide that
only individuals aged 21 years and older would violate the statute.251
Further, in cases of consensual sexual relationships arranged over the
internet, in which both parties are adolescents aged 14 to 18,252 no lifetime
sex offender registration should be imposed.
An age-based exception is warranted because a consensual sexual
relationship between adolescent peers should not be judged equivalent to
a sexual relationship between an adult and a child.253 Admittedly, even
adolescent peer intercourse is not harmless,254 however, assigning fault255
to one party in sexual relationships between adolescent peers becomes
increasingly difficult.256 Indeed, typically the “exploitation of the young”
justification for punishing an adult in these circumstances is missing from
adolescent peer sexual relationships.257
In fact, some states already recognize that an adolescent peer sexual
relationship should be treated differently than that between an adult and a
child.258 Known as “Romeo and Juliet”259 laws, these statutes provide an
248. See supra Section II.C.
249. See State v. Serpa, 187 A.3d 107, 112 (N.H. 2018) (“[I]f changes are to be made
[to reflect the change in how adolescents communicate in the digital age], the task is that
of the legislature, not this court.”); see also supra Section II.D.
250. See supra Section II.A.2.
251. A minimum age of 21 would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s recognition
that juvenile offenders are different. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). Although
individuals aged 18–21 years are legal adults, this age group is distinguishable from other
age ranges for adults. For example, adults younger than 21 years of age are prohibited from
drinking alcohol in all 50 states. See 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012).
252. Consistent with current “Romeo and Juliet” provisions already in existence.
253. See ZIMRING, supra note 131, at 125.
254. See id. at 126. It is still “inappropriate to assume that sexual relations between
two fourteen-year-olds should be regarded as equivalent to the consensual sex of two
persons in their late twenties.” Id.
255. To meet the framework of the justice system, one party to the peer sexual
relationship will be deemed the defendant, inherently the individual “to blame” for the
criminal violation. However, in these relationships there may not be a clear party to blame,
if there is one to blame at all.
256. See ZIMRING, supra note 131, at 126.
257. See id.
258. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.04354 (2008); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632A:4(II) (2018).
259. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.04354(1)(c) (2008) (providing an exception to sex
offender registration for sexual relationships between adolescent peers); see also N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 632-A:4(II).
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exception from registration when the offender “[i]s not more than 4 years
older than the victim . . . who was 13 years of age or older but younger
than 18 years of age at the time the person” engages in the prohibited
conduct.260
“Romeo and Juliet” exceptions recognize that adolescent peers
engaged in sexual activity are typically “less deserving of a registration
requirement.”261 Further, these provisions “keep ordinary individuals
involved in young love from forever being branded sexual offenders.”262
Despite the insinuations of internet solicitation statutes, there is nothing
inherently more dangerous about “individuals involved in young love”
who send an e-mail rather than those who pass a note in class.263 The
rationale underlying “Romeo and Juliet” provisions should, therefore,
extend to adolescents using the internet to engage in consensual, peer
sexual relationships.264 Accordingly, legislatures should amend internet
solicitation statutes to protect adolescents in sexual relationships from the
lifelong impact of sex offender registration.
2.

Discretionary Application of Registration Requirements

Recognizing that the exclusion of all “offenders” under the age of 21
may unintentionally shield juvenile predators265 because of their age,
legislatures may be reluctant to adopt such changes. Alternatively,
legislatures could allow judicial discretion to achieve similar ends.
Implementing judicial discretion would acknowledge the difference
between juvenile and adult offenders.266 To accomplish this, states should
require judges to use discretion and implement validated risk assessments
to determine the likelihood of recidivism and the threat each juvenile poses
to the community in the long term.
The risk assessment should use criteria to evaluate the risk,
culpability, and developmental status of the offender.267 Prior to imposing
sex offender registration for juveniles, there should be an evidentiary
hearing in which a judge sets forth the relevant factors for when to require
260. Courson v. State, 24 So. 3d 1249, 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
261. State v. Serpa, 187 A.3d 107, 112 (N.H. 2018).
262. Courson, 24 So. 3d at 1250 (internal quotation marks omitted).
263. See supra Section III.A.
264. See supra Section III.A.
265. Here, the author intends the phrase “juvenile predators” to distinguish juveniles
who intend to sexually exploit children from adolescents in consensual, sexual
relationships with peers.
266. See supra Section II.F.
267. See ZIMRING, supra note 131, at 153. Other risk factors courts could consider
include, but are not limited to, the following: deviant sexual interests, prior criminal
sanctions for sexual offending, sexual offending against more than one victim, sexual
offending against a stranger victim, social isolation, uncompleted offense-specific
treatment, and problematic parent-adolescent relationships. See Williams, supra note 130,
at 36.
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registration.268 In applying these factors, judges should find by clear and
convincing evidence that a “validated risk assessment tool” indicates the
juvenile poses a high risk of sexual reoffending.269 The registration
requirement should be imposed only if registration is determined to be the
least restrictive means of ensuring public safety.270
Requiring a finding of high risk and a lack of suitable alternatives to
ensure public safety will allow courts to provide for the interests of both
the juvenile and the community.271 This discretion would allow judges to
balance the likelihood that registration would adequately deter future
crime with the harmful effects of registration on juveniles, on a case-bycase basis.272 Although an imperfect solution, this discretion could provide
some relief in cases where juveniles would otherwise find themselves
equated to middle-aged pedophiles.273
3.

Meaningful Review or Appeal Process

For states that require lifetime registry for those convicted of internet
solicitation offenses, juvenile offenders should be offered an opportunity
to appeal on a demonstration of reform or rehabilitation. This appeal
would recognize a major difference between juvenile and adult offenders:
the reformative capacity of youth.274 Encouraging juvenile offenders’
rehabilitation would also align with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Roper, Graham, and Miller.275
Some states have already adopted measures to allow juveniles relief
from sex offender registration. Alabama, for example, allows juvenile
offenders less than four years older than their victims to petition for full
relief immediately after completing their prison sentence or the courtordered registration period.276 Similarly, Florida allows juvenile offenders
no more than four years older than their victims (older than 13 years old)
to petition for immediate relief.277 In contrast, neither Georgia nor New
Hampshire provides any specific provisions to appeal sex offender
268. See Parker & Pittman, supra note 25, at 61.
269. See id.
270. See id. (suggesting that registration be required only when “public safety cannot
be adequately protected through any means other than the youth being subject to
registration”).
271. See id.
272. The author acknowledges that the success of this remedy depends heavily on a
recognition by judges as to both the harmful effects of registration on juveniles and the
significantly low rates of recidivism among juvenile sex offenders.
273. See Dewey, supra note 59.
274. See supra Section II.F.3.
275. See supra Section II.F.1.
276. See ALA. CODE § 15-20A-24 (2017). For more serious offenses, Alabama offers
juvenile offenders the opportunity to petition for relief from lifetime registration 25 years
after release from prison. See ALA. CODE §§ 15-20A-28(b), 15-20A-34 (2017).
277. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.04354 (2008).
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registration imposed in criminal court.278 Neither Georgia nor New
Hampshire, however, provide for imposing sex offender registration in
juvenile adjudications.279
Although an increased number of states with provisions for appeal
would alleviate some of the burden sex offender registration places on
juveniles, this solution is not ideal. Without a compelling justification for
punishing adolescents engaged in consensual peer sexual relationships
(later found in violation of internet solicitation statutes280), any time spent
on a sex offender registry is harmful. Nevertheless, a meaningful appeal—
after a demonstration of reform—at least provides juvenile offenders a
chance they may never otherwise get: to get back their lives.
IV. CONCLUSION
The internet has changed immeasurably in the decades since internet
solicitation statutes were drafted.281 The intervening years have seen
significant changes to the registration of sex offenders, namely: the
inclusion of juveniles.282 In response to these societal developments,
legislatures must take action to prevent adolescents from becoming the bycatch of these statutes.283 By failing to address the consequences of internet
solicitation statutes, legislatures will continue punishing adolescents for
their chosen means of communication: the internet. To prevent this
modern tragedy, state legislatures must revise their internet solicitation
statutes. Until then, my advice to our modern Romeo is this: go to her
balcony, send a carrier pigeon, or use the pony-express; just please do not
Facebook Juliet.

278. See 50 State Comparison of Relief from Sex Offender Registration Obligation,
RESTORATION RTS. PROJECT (Nov. 1, 2017), https://bit.ly/2DnsH4N.
279. See id. Here, juvenile adjudications refer to the proceedings within the juvenile
justice system, rather than in adult criminal court. “Adjudication” refers to “the [juvenile]
court process that determines . . . if the juvenile committed the act for which he or she is
charged . . . [and is] analogous to ‘convicted’ and indicat[ing] that the court concluded the
juvenile committed the act.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Glossary, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ.
PREVENTION, https://bit.ly/2SlK4MI (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
280. See supra Section III.A.
281. See supra Section II.C.
282. See supra Section II.B.2.
283. See supra Section II.B.

